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Introduction 
In this article, we engage with the literature on differences and conflict discussing principles on which 
planning might proceed in deeply divided societies. While planning has traditionally been regarded as 
a public sector top-down practice, increasingly planners have now started to also engage with bottom-
up initiatives which may take place beyond the boundaries of the planning profession, seeing a 
transformative potential in these through mechanisms of coproduction (Ostrom, 1996; Evans, 1996; 
Albrechts, 2012).  Sometimes marginal, often small scale, these practices, are however argued to be 
important;  while remaining attuned and embedded in local contexts, they can reveal the presence of 
normative ideals that potentially transcend the local. Studying such localised practices then means 
seeking ways in which normative ideas may be embedded in specific practices; therefore, seeking the 
abstraction of norms from the constructions of specificity enables the suggestion of principles that may 
transcend practices. Such an abstraction helps planners to recognise the transformative potential in 
projects even when these projects are not by themselves transformative in their current form. This study 
holds a view of the future that is not always determined by overwhelming structural forces of power, in 
the face of which action is inevitably destined to futility. Instead, this study embeds a faith in the 
potential for change that can be constructed through informed actions of multiple actors. In this sense 
the paper adopts a constructivist view of society, a view that allows for the construction of ideas, 
discourses and agendas that in turn frame and prompt action.  
 
It is difficult to overstate the complexity of a project that aims to articulate a set of planning theories 
that speak to the realities of the global South-East as differentiated from the global North-West (Watson, 
2009a, 2013; Yiftachel, 2006). This is for the simple reason that such a category is hugely diverse with 
situations on the ground spanning the entire spectrum of relative affluence to extreme poverty and 
relative harmony to ‘deep differences’ (Watson, 2006: 31).These divisions are also cast along a variety 
of cleavages each with its own particular dynamics, which in turn are compounded by numerous 
combinations of factors creating local uniqueness that defy easy generalisation. For instance, some 
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factors highlighted by Watson (2009a) include rapidly increasing populations bringing with it new 
challenges for urban planning such as proliferation of slums and informal housing;  infrastructure and 
other service deliveries being sourced from the community or other informal providers rather than the 
state; widening gaps between and within regions due to globalisation;  rising centrality of informality 
as a ‘dominant mode of behaviour’ (p.2263) and under regulation leading to shady alliances, shifting 
definitions of legal/illegal and widespread prevalence of crime and violence. Some of these factors 
might also be found in the West and one could argue that this is becoming increasingly so, with the 
reality of the economic recession, deep inequality in wealth and the multi-cultural nature of 
contemporary Western cities. Conflict, deep difference, extreme poverty, and violence, then may no 
longer be the exclusive purview of the South-East. However, at the moment, extremes in adverse 
conditions may be more likely and more common, yet by no means exclusive, to the South-East. If this 
is accepted, then planning theorists need to be looking at theorisation for particular sets of conditions 
regardless of this being in the North, South, East or West. Experiences from the North- West or the 
South-East may then be drawn upon as long as the set of conditions make it relevant to the theorisation 
project undertaken.  The level of theory one wishes to engage in will also influence the wider potential 
for applicability. So the applicability of a middle level theory may be more limited (geographically or 
contextually) than the applicability of a more generalised or abstract theory (see Chettiparamb, 2014 
for more on levels of theory).  
Within the context of the global South-East, the focus in this paper is on difference in the case of 
Lebanon, a country deeply divided by sectarian, political and social differences. We search for projects 
that may hold the potential for bridging such differences without eliminating the same in an idea of the 
universal citizen that denies difference (Fincher and Jacobs, 1998).  This identification is a pre-condition 
for scaling up from bottom-up initiatives for affirmative action. The key question is then how we would 
recognise such a potential. This paper suggests a ‘five-pathway framework’ that is consolidated and 
derived from the planning and the political science literature that discuss conflict and contexts of deep 
difference. We do not suggest that the ‘five pathway framework’ present a set of coherent categories 
that together define an epistemological position in planning. Rather they are different approaches 
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identified following a careful search in the planning and political science literature; a search that posed 
the question: ‘What approaches have been identified as holding the promise for bridging deep 
differences?’ This was posed to answer the wider epistemological question for planning that we were 
interested in: ‘What principles must planners seek in projects in deeply divided societies to recognize 
potential for scaling up?’  The ‘five pathways’ are therefore disparate pathways that are brought together 
loosely in a framework by virtue of their appearance as answers to the epistemological question posed 
earlier. This framework is thereafter used to identify transformative potentials in two projects of civic 
engagement operationalised by non-state actors, who are not urban planners.   
The next section provides an overall contextual description of Lebanon highlighting its particularities.  
We then discuss the problem of planning in deeply divided contexts and identify five pathways that 
have the potential for transcending divisions inspired from literatures in planning and political science. 
The next section presents data from two bridging initiatives in Beirut, Lebanon, which are reviewed 
under the framework developed. The following section discusses the insights gained by applying the 
five pathways approach to the bridging practices, and finally we draw our conclusions. 
The Lebanese context 
Lebanon has an important geo-political location between the East and West, which has driven this small 
country to be embroiled in external conflicts in the region (Milton-Edwards, 2000). Modernisation took 
place in its early history following the fall of the Ottoman Empire (El Khazen, 2000) in the First World 
War. Lebanon was then under French mandate, until its constitution as the Republic of Lebanon in 
1943, an officially secular state (Bollens, 2012).  Due to its openness, modernisation, free-market 
economy and in particular banking services, pre-war Lebanon was referred to as the Switzerland of the 
East (Moubayed, 2007). The civil war, marked by a religious divide between Muslims and Christians, 
erupted in 1975 and its end was declared in 1989 with the Taif Agreement. Since then Lebanon has 
seen further conflict and violence, for instance, the political turmoil following the assassination of 
former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005, followed by the war with Israel in 2006, and further 
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political and sectarian conflicts from 2007 to present.  At present the repercussions of the Syrian conflict 
are affecting the political and security situation in Lebanon. 
Political factors 
The turbulent history of Lebanon has led to the collapse of the political system and a state that is 
weakened by consecutive wars and conflicts. Since its constitution, Lebanon, unlike its neighbours has 
tended to maintain its pluralism with its officially recognised 18 confessions (Bollens, 2012). This is 
reflected in the consociational form of government or specifically confessionalism, that characterises 
the state in Lebanon today (Jones, 2007). Consociationalism is a coalition government by a politically 
elite group, which represents different segments in society. Institutionally, it is characterised by a pre-
determined system of proportionality in public appointments, mutual vetoes and segmental authority 
(Milton-Edwards, 2000). When the different segments are divided along confessional lines, 
consociationalism becomes confessionalism1. In Lebanon key positions are assigned to represent the 
various sects: the President is always a Christian Maronite, the Prime minister, a Sunnite Muslim and 
the speaker of parliament, a Shiite Muslim (Nagle and Clancy, 2012)2.  
Over the years, confessionalism together with a combination of internal and external factors has led to 
considerable instability and infighting in Lebanon resulting in the perception of a weak state. As Jones 
(2007: 104) states:  
Today it [Lebanon] features, at least in the Western imagination, as the absolute epitome of 
destructive sectarian conflict, a zone without even the semblance of normal politics – violent, 
impossible and insoluble.   
Alongside sectarianism, there is also a trend for leadership to stay in the family and with communal 
leaders, leading to the predominance of society over the state and the presence of feudal socialists in 
government (El Khazen, 2000). Jones (2007) reports that less than a quarter of members in the 2000 
                                                          
1 Note that in this paper we use the term sectarianism and confessionalism interchangeably, to mean different 
sects within each of the two main religions: Christianity and Islam. 
2 This allocation of power was initially based on the 1932 census and proportion of sects (Genberg, 2002), with 
some adjustments done during the Taif Agreement and then in Doha in 2008 (Bollens, 2012). 
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parliament were members of political parties, a situation that led the political scientist and MP Farid el 
Khazen to state that ‘Lebanon does not have a party system’ (Quoted in Jones, 2007: 109).  
Deep difference 
Sectarianism in Lebanon has been attributed to two histories: one internal and the other external (Larkin, 
2012). Internally, sectarianism has been argued to be ‘primordial’, based on ‘social bonds of cohesion 
found in tribal, kinship or communitarian solidarities’ (Larkin, 2012: 42; Khalaf and Denoeux, 1998). 
Arguably, this aspect continues in the clientelism and patronage of politically active families in Lebanon 
(Larkin, 2012). Externally, it has been argued that the Ottoman Empire implanted sectarianism as a tool 
for ruling over groups in Lebanon (Larkin, 2012). This external perspective on sectarianism attempts to 
explain changes over time influenced by external politics as politico-sectarian coalitions vary according 
to prevailing political circumstances (Makdisi, 2008:559 in Larkin, 201: 43). 
Different wars, linked to internal and external factors, whose objectives and actors have changed over 
time, have been fought on Lebanese territories (El Khazen, 2000). Unlike many conflict prone countries 
however, the wars in Lebanon were not primarily a protest against an authoritarian state, but were more 
a result of clashes between sectarian identities. The main ethnicity is Arab, although one part of the 
population manifests affinities with non-Arab countries mostly on the basis of religion and culture 
(Salibi, 2003).  In addition to the two main religions and 18 sects, there is also the influx of refugees in 
the country, mainly Palestinian and now Iraqi and Syrian. This is a country where partly due to the weak 
state and partly due to strong divisions, allegiances and identities are to the sect or religion, or even to 
capital rather than the state. Consequently, civil society was from the outset powerful and active (El 
Kahzen, 2000).  
The divided nature of society and the weakness of the state have led to sectarian communities, some of 
which operate as a state alternative by offering much needed services to their sectarian division within 
society (Cammett, 2011; Jones, 2007; Roy, 2009). These are large scale organizations wielding 
considerable clout.  Our interest however is on transformative practices that may have the potential to 
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bridge across sectarian divides. Hence, here we focus on particular activities of civil society that are not 
specifically defined in terms of religious or sectarian belongings.  
Post-war Beirut is polarised into a predominantly Muslim West and Christian East along a demarcation 
line that splits the city (Khalaf, 2002). Significant numbers of internal population displacements have 
also taken place during the Lebanese war, resulting in settlements in and around Beirut (Khalaf, 2002). 
Events after 2005 have contributed to new divisions across sects rather than religions, mainly between 
Shiites and Sunnis. This has had spatial repercussions not only within some of Beirut’s districts, but 
also within its suburbs (Bou Akar, 2012). The complexity of the post-war divides, and demographic 
changes related to sects and locations in and around Beirut simultaneously indicate highly homogeneous 
areas with one predominant sect alongside signs of mixing, especially along the former war-time 
demarcation line (Bollens, 2012: 162). While places of residence are relatively homogeneous, and some 
residents such as Hezbollah followers in the southern suburbs have a strong sense of belonging to their 
area (Deeb and Harb, 2013, Roy, 2009), work, leisure and commerce seem to include a mix of 
confessions (Bollens, 2012). 
Economic factors 
Lebanon is classified in the High HDI category and is ranked 72 from 187 countries (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2013). The overall level of economic development is relatively better than 
some other nations in the global South-East. However, Lebanese society has been described as having 
an almost depleted middle class, leaving an elite class of well-off Lebanese and an influx of less well-
off diaspora, expats and refugees.  
State policies in Lebanon have tended to support private property and private development in parallel 
with a liberal and free-market economy. This has encouraged significant investment in real estate, and 
one specific example is the reconstruction of the historical city centre that was planned and managed 
by the public-private real estate company Solidere, established under the decree 117 in 1991. 
Mechanisms of neo-liberal control of spaces and the development of shopping malls, high-end 
residential towers and waterfronts are also seen in Lebanon (Roy, 2009).  
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Planning in deeply divided and conflict prone societies 
One of the authors who have discussed planning in deeply divided societies is Vanessa Watson (2002, 
2006, 2009a, 2013). Lebanon does not align completely with all the ‘stubborn realities’ highlighted by 
Watson (2013), in particular the nature of division, its historic genesis and its relationship with power 
and the economy as explained in the previous section. However, it reveals a unique context, 
characterised by ‘deeply divided’ fissures cast primarily along religious, political, sectarian, and social 
lines. As such it is relevant to the central concern for Watson: what does planning theory have to offer 
to planning practice in societies that are ‘deeply divided’? Watson investigates the potential of 
procedural theories from an eclectic mix of communicative planning; political economy-based just city 
approaches; and the more post- modern approach of insurgency planning, which though informative in 
Western contexts, are argued to be of limited relevance to South-Eastern contexts (Watson, 2013). 
Explorations of theorisations in the literature on state-society synergies highlighting notions of 
complementarity; understandings of the emergence of new types of urbanisms and urban spaces, and 
the urban design literature that highlights design interventions in such contexts are argued, to be 
potentially valuable theoretical strands that could contribute towards the larger project of ‘a view from 
the South’ (Watson, 2013: 95; see also Watson 2002, 2009a).  We extend this enquiry by recognising 
that Planning is also inherently a political activity (Albrechts, 2003), and in a similar vein to Watson 
(2013), we find insights and experiences that are valuable for planners in the political science literature. 
We draw on these to suggest that, in low scale bottom-up practices, planners might recognise one or 
more of five alternate pathways to bridge deep divisions. The routes and mechanisms for up-scaling 
these through myriad workings of the politics of power in institutions, actors and discourses are separate 
topics that are not addressed in this paper3. 
                                                          
3 Routes to scaling up transformation or mechanisms through which planners can achieve change have been 
suggested by various authors such as by the production of ‘sticky stories’ where planners act as ‘connectors’ and 
‘policy entrepreneurs’ (van der Stoep, 2014); through strategies and tactics operationalised through a dialectic of 
structure and agency (see strategic-relational approach suggested by Jessop, 2001, Chettiparamb, 2007; through 
models of change suggested by Woerkum, et.al. (2011); forms of planning such as insurgent planning 
(Sandercock, 2004), to name a few). 
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The confessional form of government in Lebanon has been defended on the grounds that it is a 
mechanism for avoiding conflict and protecting the rights of distinct communities by affording all a 
share in power (Jones, 2007). Often the call against an anti-consensus view is informed by the rather 
bitter experience of aggravated violence and spiralling mistrust that result from an imposition of 
idealised democracy in a society that is internally torn. Consociational government then represents a 
view where differences in society are accepted as immutable and fundamental. The grounds are 
therefore pragmatic and non-normative given the ‘deeply divided’ nature of society. Proponents also 
argue that undesirable collective identities are likely to dissolve in the longer term after a period of 
consociational governance (O’Leary, 2005 cited in Nagle and Clancy, 2012). The rejection of the 
possibility of political consensus here echoes Watson’s call in the planning discipline for a different 
form of planning in contexts characterised by ‘deep differences’, one that does not rely on consensus or 
a shared vision in societies (Watson, 2013). 
Such forms of Government have also been critiqued primarily on the grounds that they institutionalise 
divisions in societies, thus preventing them from acquiring the skills and values necessary to transform 
into societies with shared sets of values (Nagle and Clancy, 2012). As Watson (2002) argues, 
valorisation of division is not always pragmatic and as such can lead to negative impacts. Further, 
institutionalisation of difference can also come at a cost in the long-term in that deep differences deepen 
even further. In this article therefore, as mentioned at the start, we adopt a constructivist view wherein 
the possibility of a bottom-up bridging of divisions exists.  
A constructivist view to social differences sees the social consequence of ethnicity, race, sect, religion 
or by extension other difference as constructed in particular contexts by social agents through social 
processes. This is against the primordial view of identities as given and immutable across time and 
space. The primordial view thus urges the irreconcilability of difference by denying the possibility of 
recreation of identities (Bayar, 2009). A constructivist view on the other hand admits the possibility for 
a shift in the social antecedents and consequences of deep divisions. According to this view, even if 
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current deep divisions in society may necessitate their accommodation, it is possible to imagine a polity 
that can develop or acquire values that are not necessarily confined to particular sects or religions. This 
may require the construction of additional identities that transcend more narrow identities, alongside 
current ones, and it is this possibility that lends itself to the promise of transformative change. In 
planning, such a constructivist view can be discerned in the consensus oriented communicative planning 
stream, which argues for the possibility of a shift in entrenched interests as a fundamental advantage 
(Innes, 2004; Forester, 2012). The central question to be posed then is: can a civil society be built based 
on values that may extend beyond one’s own more narrowly defined individual, family, community, 
religious or sectarian identity?   
We suggest five pathways that planning might work with such that, whilst the deeply divided nature of 
society is acknowledged, the cultivation of values that extend beyond a narrow identity is aimed. The 
paper is thus not focused so much on unravelling the mechanisms of how one or the other of the 
‘pathways’ defined might work. The focus is more on the ‘what’. In other words, what characteristics, 
might hold the potential for change? Even if the particular manifestation or combination of the five 
pathways would be context dependent, we believe that it is not restricted to deeply divided contexts in 
the global South-East, but will be applicable to all contexts where the deeply divided nature of society 
is a reality. 
Economic liberalism 
The argument for economic liberalism in planning is not new as expressed in the writings of many 
authors (Holcombe, 2013; Luo et al., 2013; Silva, 2011, for instance). In deeply divided societies, the 
argument is however slightly more nuanced. Economic liberalism when advanced as an ideology that 
can be deployed for bridging conflicts simply suggests that interest in economic prosperity and self 
advancement can be deployed by planners and others to erase fissures of difference by substituting 
identity politics with an interest in individual economic progress. As Montesquieu states: 
Commerce cures destructive prejudices; and it is almost a general rule that wherever there 
are soft morals... there is commerce; and that wherever there is commerce, there are soft 
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morals... One can say that the laws of commerce perfect the morals, for the same reason 
that these same laws destroy the morals. Commerce corrupts pure morals; that was why 
Plato complained of it; commerce polishes and softens barbarians’ morals, as we are 
seeing every day. (Montesquieu quoted in Pangle, 2009: 22). 
Commerce, it is argued, though a double edged sword, can potentially have a mediating effect in the 
face of extremist politics by promoting opportunities for self advancement through cooperation. Though 
at a larger scale, the EU is a classic example of the promotion of the rhetoric of regional cooperation 
for economic advancement intentionally mobilised and promoted with the intention of resolving 
conflicts amongst European nations (Gebhard and Galbreath, 2013).  The political project subsequently 
was also a planning project. 
Using the case of Northern Ireland, Nagle and Clancy (2012) however argue that identity based fissures 
once created, cannot easily be stemmed by economic liberalism alone. Further, in the absence of a 
strong state that can ensure redistribution, free market dynamics can exacerbate existing fissures by 
favouring those identities that are able to access the fruits of market based reforms. Chirot (2009) argues 
that economic disparity, independent of general levels of wealth, can fuel identity based mobilisation 
of hatred, especially when the lines of fissures in one mirrors the other. Reconciling divisions can then 
prove to be more difficult. A high general economic prosperity is then no guarantee for avoidance of 
conflict.  
Place based identities 
Place based identities may be formed at any scale: national, regional or local. Planning theorists have 
long argued for the power of place based initiatives - often local - to promote integration, consensus 
and thereby bridge differences (Healey, 1997; Stephenson, 2010 for instance). In a political project 
within deeply divided societies such place-based planning initiatives have added significance as they 
can be methods to counteract more entrenched factional identities. Examples of the promotion of such 
place based identities in conflict ridden contexts include the promotion of a regional Northern Ireland 
or Ulster identity to counteract the division in Northern Ireland (Nagle and Clancy, 2012). Care is of 
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course needed to ensure that such place based id entities are not conceived in terms of particular group 
identities leading to a reinforcement of existing divisions. Efforts to develop such place based identities 
must therefore be wary of and remain proactive in managing the development of any dominant factional 
bias4.  
Interest based Identities 
Intersectional analyses from feminist studies have highlighted the multiple identity positions that we 
occupy in our everyday life (Phoenix and Pattynama, 2006 for instance). Not all of these multiple 
identities necessarily constitute fissures leading to deep difference. Some of the multiple simultaneous 
identities might be defined by interests, for example, being a singer or an artist, while some may be 
defined by personal relationships such as being a mother or daughter. In this case it is possible that 
certain identities might allow for the bridging of more contentious divisional identities.  For instance, 
in societies that are ethnically divided, language or religion might provide unifying identities. Similarly, 
interest based identities such as sports or a perceived common foe can provide a unifying identity. The 
challenge is to encourage or allow for such ‘bridging identities’ to surface as an organising force strong 
enough to allow for mobilisation, one which encapsulates transformative politics with the capacity to 
bridge across divides. Where present or enabled, such identities are worth exploring. 
Consensus oriented processes 
Consensus oriented practices place emphasis on the power of the ‘better’ argument to triumph when the 
parties to the argument actively work towards creating conditions of argumentation that are perceived 
to be fair to all interested. The aim usually is to allow for communication and negotiation based on a 
common understanding of fair values. Consensus oriented communicative planning theory advanced 
by Healey (1997), Innes (2004) and Forrester (2012) among others, are well known in planning theory.  
                                                          
4 For case studies and a fuller discussion on the creation of place based identities in planning see for 
instance Hague and Jenkins (2005) or Neill (1999). 
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It has been argued that consensus oriented processes can only work when there is agreement that the 
differences between communities will be relegated to a ‘private’ sphere while the public sphere appears 
as ‘neutral’ (Seligman, 2009). Also conditions for ‘ideal communication’, which necessarily require the 
suppression of power, have been argued to be incredibly difficult, if not impossible to create (Hillier, 
2003).  Accordingly, it has been argued that consensus oriented practice works only if there is a degree 
of homogeneity and consensus already in society and that therefore this is not a workable proposition 
for societies characterised by deep divisions (Watson, 2006). 
However, a large part of the work by Innes, Forrester and Healey, to name few authors, are derived 
from practices that have worked on the ground, in situations characterised by conflict. It is true that 
much of the above work comes from settings characterised by generally shared secular values which 
may not necessarily exist in deeply divided societies at a particular time. However, discounting 
consensus oriented practices altogether as irrelevant in the ‘real world’ or to contexts of deep difference, 
in our view, would be to throw the baby out with the bath water for the possibility for the same must be 
acknowledged to even make a start towards transformative practice. Such transformative practice must 
aim not just at projects or initiatives, though this may well constitute initial steps, but must imagine the 
possibility of a society that has the capacity to transcend factional identities. The works of planning 
theorists in consensus oriented planning have provided a rich and diverse set of micro-practices that 
could be effective to progress towards such a vision. They have also shown us the impact of different 
variables (venue, timing, stakeholder choice and so on, which in turn are influenced by power) on a 
situation to facilitate or impede consensus. A discussion for planning in deeply divided societies must 
then necessarily also build on these insights. 
Institutionalisation 
Institutional approaches rely upon institutions to encourage and promote a system of accommodative 
behaviour (Alexander, 2005; Healey, 1999, 2006; Moroni, 2010). It is an approach that relies upon the 
transformation of structures of social life from the bottom-up or top-down.  These institutional 
structures might endeavour to facilitate or stabilise accommodative and transformative behaviour even 
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though they may coexist with ‘uncivil’ practices and institutions. Processes of institutionalisation 
however often place an additional call on resources and require engagement with formal structures, 
which in deeply divided societies are often non-responsive. The challenge is to find ways of building 
up credibility and momentum that allow for the institutionalisation of often fragile processes through 
resources and networks of alliances where none might have existed. 
The above review of the planning and political science literature suggests that the following five 
pathways – economic liberalism; place based identities; interest based identities; consensus oriented 
processes and institutionalism - can open up potentials and opportunities for transformative action. The 
potential dangers and challenges for a project of bridging deep differences in each of these ways have 
also been highlighted. Given the conflicting interests and powers operating in these difficult contexts 
of deep divisions, it does not take much for a project to swing from one extreme to the other. Therefore, 
planners attempting to build up transformative potential from the bottom up, in deeply divided societies, 
need to be able to recognise both the potentials and drawbacks in the specificities of an initiative for 
corrective action. Such a recognition is arguably the first step in building up politics of engagement 
towards transformative change.  
 In the next section we introduce two bottom-up initiatives in Beirut. The five pathway framework is 
used her to and examine and analyse the cases for their potential for transformative change at a particular 
point of time 
The case studies 
This section gives a brief account of the methods used for the fieldwork conducted in 2007, introduces 
two case studies, and focuses on the five-pathways framework as manifested in both. This framework 
allows us to highlight the features of each case, which hold potentials for a transformative project. 
The research used a case study approach for a rich portrayal of two market cases within municipal 
Beirut to elucidate, explain and promote understandings that are generalisable beyond the purview of 
the specific context studied (Yin, 1981; Flyvberg, 2006). The case studies have been chosen because 
they are instances of bottom-up citizen led initiatives that manage to span more entrenched 
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sectarian/religious identities5.  Methods used included interviews and observations. Interviews with 
about 50 visitors to each market, all five vendors in the flower market and 14 vendors in the farmers 
market were conducted. Vendors came from various parts of Lebanon (see Table 1).  Visitors came 
from administrative Beirut, but also its Southern and North-Eastern suburbs, indicating mobility to the 
centre outside their everyday territories. As mentioned earlier, spatial distribution in Beirut is very much 
based on sects/religions and therefore in the absence of the possibility for obtaining direct data on 
sectarian/religious identities in the conflict ridden context of Beirut, the spatial distribution has been 
taken as indicative of social divisions. In both markets, respondents suggested that though buying and 
selling characterise these spaces, the markets’ value goes beyond consumption; the markets provide 
opportunities for enjoying being in the city by watching others, hanging around, sitting idle, 
encountering others outside their daily social circles, meeting friends or practising other activities that 
they enjoy, and experiencing Beirut in a different manner.  
The two markets are centrally located, and easily accessible from different locations that are not 
necessarily categorised as ‘East’ or West’ Beirut. The markets are also significant in that they do not 
target the kind of high end clientele that real estate developers such as Solidere do. This was evident in 
the responses of vendors and visitors, who were happy to see a spontaneous, self-organised parking 
space in contrast to the designed and sophisticated Solidere environment in the central district.  
Table 1. Locations from which vendors and visitors come to the two markets as per interviews in 2007. 
Coming from Flower vendor Flower visitor Farmers’ vendor Farmers’ visitor 
Beirut, East 0 23 0 14 
Beirut, West 0 12 1 21 
Beirut, Central 0 1 0 5 
Beirut, Southern suburbs 0 2 0 2 
Beirut, Northern and Eastern suburbs 1 3 2 3 
Mount Lebanon 2 6 5 5 
South Lebanon 0 0 2 0 
North Lebanon 0 0 1 0 
The Beqaa 1 0 3 0 
Total interviewed 4 47 14 50 
                                                          
5 More formal public spaces provided by the state such as Horsh Beirut and the Corniche waterfront have 
therefore been exlcuded. 
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Figure 1. Map of municipal Beirut indicating temporary public spaces, the pre-1991 demarcation line and 
boundaries of the city centre. 
 
The flower market: Souq el Zhoor. The flower market is a seasonal weekend market organised on 
vacant land that serves as a parking lot on weekdays near to the city centre. It started operating in 2000. 
The market is organised by a syndicate of flower farmers who explicitly stress and promote a Lebanese 
identity by only showcasing flowers that are indigenous species planted and grown by Lebanese farmers 
in Lebanon. The political and national agenda of the organisers can be seen in the founding motives 
expressed below:  
In the year 2000, after all the suffering from the war, they [120 Lebanese plant and flower 
farmers] formed a syndicate to try and disseminate their produce … We are able to reach out 
to the Lebanese people and even educate them and encourage them to beautify their micro-
environments … We are trying to bring back the heritage of Beirut and the plants that were 
popular. There are plants that have always been planted here and are familiar to the people, to 
older generations and through memories, for example the jasmine … We are not here for 
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business … above all there is interaction between vendor and client. There is a relation, a human 
relation and this is the beauty, the connection is the plant itself (Interview with the market 
organiser, 2007). 
Given the sectarian polarisation, a notional group - the ‘Lebanese people’ - is the imagined client here. 
References to a heritage through a tradition of indigenous horticulture emphasise qualities of place over 
and above diverse or individualised cultural or social heritages. The ‘Lebanese flower’ or plant thus 
becomes a potential common identifier that aims to cut across socio-cultural divisions. Further, the 
market takes on a dissemination role in that it aims to educate the ‘Lebanese’ about their own place 
centred heritage whilst also encouraging further such localised dissemination. This occurs through 
episodic place based face to face interaction between vendor and visitor on the one hand and by evoking 
‘beauty’ and ‘micro-environments’, in other words through the promotion of a place centred aesthetics 
and ecology on the other hand. The flower market thus becomes a place based political project that 
attempts to forge a new Lebanese identity through place centred instruments as in the case of Ireland 
discussed earlier. 
Consumption is a daily social task involving the imperative to buy and sell products and services; but 
also lifestyle choices, ambiences, and ideas. Market places have therefore long been acknowledged as 
social places, places where social connections may be made and re-made, values reignited or discarded 
and the stranger encountered or avoided (Watson, 2009b). Both vendors and buyers are aware that the 
flower market is not just about consumption, but that it serves a larger social purpose. 
 So it is more than buy and sell, we have friends and relations with people (Interview with 
flower farmer 4, 2007) 
Yes of course. You can build relations between people and understand the sociology of the 
markets. (Interview with visitor 2, 2007) 
The flower markets intentionally pursue an inclusive agenda, making sure that flower farmers come 
from different parts of the country and are of different religions and sects. This variety is then not just 
ideologically consistent with the forging of a Lebanese identity, but also makes good business sense. 
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The ideological underpinning however invokes a nostalgic past linked to a heritage of a different sort 
of social life and physical environment, thereby rekindling a sense of national pride which whilst 
contributing to business, also reinforces a Lebanese identity. 
It reminds me of the village markets across Lebanon, and in rural areas (Interview with visitor 
2, 2007) 
Plants also remind me of an old house in Aleyh [in the Lebanese mountains] where I used to 
spend my summers! (Interview with visitor 40, 2007) 
Of course, it is a place I think of because in Europe they do have these weekly markets all over, 
we do not have that, except for this place, it makes me feel proud! A place where all such 
flowers are exposed, am not sure if Arab countries have that at all; so when I see a blooming 
tree, I just feel happy! (Interview with visitor 40, 2007) 
The flower market then effectively mobilises the social practice of consumption and transforms it as a 
constitutive practice for emphasising a Lebanese identity. 
Flowers, gardens and flower markets are also an interest area. An interest in gardens and flowers per se 
is non-sectarian in its scope. Yet, its subject - flowers and plants - have the capacity to interest and 
mobilise subjects. These can be through diverse ways of engagement including livelihoods, hobbies 
and simple passive enjoyment. Such an affect can be seen through some of the responses from the user 
interviews below:  
The meaning it has is that in Lebanon the farming of flowers is developing and this makes us 
happy and that this cultural phenomenon is growing. But since last year, we feel bad because 
the situation has such a negative impact on this development… it is a call for improving 
Lebanese production, to meet those who are attracted to values such as beauty and nature and 
also you would help those vendors (Interview with visitor 22, 2007) 
I love flowers this is the attraction! (Interview with visitor 25, 2007) 
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In Souq el Zhoor people go to gather, spend time and enjoy the flowers (Interview with visitor 
8, 2007) 
An interest based grouping by definition spans divides and brings people together into a common project 
as they come to be defined by the interest. Through ideological underpinnings, the flower market 
mobilises an interest based group into the political project of emphasising a national identity in the place 
of a sectarian identity.  
The spatial location for the flower market was secured through a) the formation of a farmer’s collective 
syndicate, which increased the bargaining power of farmers; b) the decision to locate in central Beirut, 
rather than the outskirts so as to enable easier access as well as occupy territory perceived as ‘neutral’; 
c) the temporary re-use of a vacant car park lot in central Beirut which allowed for functioning with 
limited resources in a  highly priced location and d) the securing of a permit from the municipality to 
hold the market thereby legitimising the endeavour (see Mady, 2013 for more on the location choice).  
Beirut is a city with a shortage in public spaces (Mady, 2012). Following the war period, public spaces 
were annihilated due to the danger in being in an open urban space. After the war, and with the 
construction boom and real estate development, very little open space remains in the city. Also, the 
municipality only managed the few remaining public spaces, without creating a plan of providing new 
space to cater for the rising population (Mady, 2012). Under such conditions of shortage, finding and 
securing open spaces for conducting the flower markets is indeed a significant challenge. A further 
complication is presented by the polarised settlement geography of Beirut. As described earlier, the 
demarcation line cuts through Beirut effectively dividing the city into two sectarian parts. This means 
that the choice of location mattered, for the location carried with it connotations of sectarian allegiances, 
and central locations are the remaining few ‘untinted’ ones as explained earlier. In addition the bottom-
up nature of the initiative also meant limited access to resources and limited access to authority (unlike 
government driven projects) necessitating this temporary nature. 
The farmers’ market: Souq el Tayeb. The farmer’s market shares many of the characteristics of the 
flower market described earlier. This market started in 2004 and was organised through a food 
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producers’ trading association. The market takes place on Saturdays, again on a vacant lot that is used 
as a parking facility on week days. As in the case of the flower market, the organisers explicitly promote 
a Lebanese identity, but this time through food and culinary culture. This principal goal is reflected in 
the following quotes: 
It is not only commercial; it rather helps small producers to market their products, gives them 
a chance as well as encourages people to know about traditional Lebanese food (Interview with 
visitor 8, 2007) 
No it is not commercial. It serves a social purpose: you cannot pinpoint differences between the 
people mainly it gathers people of different regions and religions, especially in a country like 
Lebanon; people with different mentalities, I don’t know, something gathers people irrespective 
of their background/mentality. It might be as simple as an apple, you know? … They do not 
have at all a common characteristic; there is no stereotype. (Interview with visitor 1, 2007) 
We see here then a reference to ‘food nationalism’ through the promotion of Lebanese produce and 
culinary culture, which brings together individuals of various backgrounds. Besides the direct 
interaction of users with vendors in the market on Saturdays, promotion is also done by the organisation 
of other ancillary and complementary activities such as Lebanese culinary competitions on Sundays in 
different parts of Beirut but also Lebanon. Thus again the food market becomes a place centred 
instrument to emphasise a place centred heritage. 
Alongside the emphasis on Lebanese produce, its many variations and Lebanese cooking, values that 
are linked with the materiality of the product such as ‘freshness’, ‘organic’, ‘healthy’, and ‘tasty’ are 
also invoked. These attract an interest based clientele who are aware of the food supply chain and are 
interested in making life-style choices that they believe to be healthy and non-exploitative.  
For sure; it has a health value more than the commercial value, and I am very conscious about 
food chain and food supply (Interview with visitor 20, 2007) 
20 
 
From the few I met there, they are THE people who like to cook they go and choose things to 
make a special meal, we go back to the essence of taste. ….you go there for small quantities, it 
is not a mass production (Interview with visitor 18, 2007) 
It [the souq] signifies what I just said, green agriculture, value products and buying directly 
from producers … beyond its commercial, first and foremost green agriculture, also awareness 
value and a way of life, how to grow your food without chemicals, encourage the producers 
and direct contact with consumers (Interview with visitor 49, 2007) 
No, naturally it is commercial but has other values, the fact you come and buy natural products 
indicates it is not only commercial, it has an awareness value (Interview with visitor 46 2007) 
The farmer’s market also exploits its material base to actively promote a sense of public space, which, 
as mentioned earlier, is undersupplied in Beirut. The market is thus characterised by the provision of a 
gathering place, and a meeting point, alongside a diversification of activities.  
Having a gathering place, which is completely lacking in a city like Beirut and is completely 
needed in a city that was shattered for such a long time. So playgrounds or parks are not enough; 
[one] should create a need, a necessity like buying vegetables and products of a certain quality 
[organic] not available elsewhere (Interview with market organiser, 2007). 
The ambience of open space and people buying is interesting, rather than what is really 
displayed for selling; especially that we do not have open space activities in Lebanon anymore 
(they are not widespread) (Interview with visitor 2, 2007) 
Sure, look at the public here! It is a mixture! What else do you want! If you go in a garden in 
Beirut, you will not find the same thing! You have a variety of goods and people hence come 
(Interview with visitor 10, 2007) 
Personally yes, it is a meeting point; there is everything here and there is a mix of everything 
and everyone here! (Interview with visitor 23, 2007) 
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The farmers’ market is also a place of consumption, and caters to the mundane social activity of buying, 
selling and exchange. Price levels and accessibility are important attributes of markets, which can 
promote or restrict inclusivity and thus contribute or impede the inclusivity of ideological aims. While 
accessibility did not seem an issue, we got mixed responses on perceptions of price levels:   
Open to everyone, you can just go there and buy nothing; it helps in experiencing Beirut in a 
different way (Interview with visitor 1, 2007) 
Definitely, it is accessible to everybody, every passer-by could come in, it is not inhibiting, it 
is open to all - it is not like a gallery (Interview with visitor 49, 2007) 
Yes it is very accessible, even in winter. Also, it is well fit in its context: everything is so rich 
and classy and this souq is in contrast to all (Interview with visitor 1, 2007) 
There are no restrictions, at least not technical except for the price range; but again, one does 
not have to buy to be there (Interview with visitor 2, 2007) 
Socially, it is important that it is free from sectarian and political issues. Also the food is 
healthy. People here are not after the money at all, even if prices are high, but the treatment of 
the vendors compensates as well as the healthy food … Of course [it is public]. All types of 
people come here far from sectarianism and politics. All people are equal here (Interview with 
visitor 19, 2007) 
It suits all levels, and even if one does not have money, they can still find something to suit 
them. Also people could come just to change atmosphere and I love the place, the ‘manzar’ 
[view]’ (Interview with visitor 40, 2007) 
By embedding an ideological project in the daily practices of consumption, the farmer’s market 
manages to engage in a political project that transcends the act of consumption evoking conviviality 
and promoting a sense of inclusiveness revolving around shared Lebanese identity beyond sectarianism. 
For at least some, it seemed to connect to what was termed ‘a spirit of the village’.   
22 
 
Personally, I love markets because this is the place where you find real people and real life. In 
markets, you learn about the life of the country... Because we always wanted to have the 
educational and awareness approach… It is not about this tomato and cucumber but about the 
“why”; then you would certainly buy those products … it is a life choice (Interview with the 
organiser, 2007).  
Yes, natural life brings people together; it gathers people of different religions and backgrounds 
and you do not feel any differences, political or religious (Interview with visitor 42, 2007)  
Spaces such that are rare, rare spaces of conviviality, with the spirit of the village. Other places 
are commercial, political or ‘social’ so this is the only place of conviviality (Interview with 
visitor 7, 2007) 
 
Planning in conflict situations 
We suggested earlier that the central question for planning in societies defined by ‘deep differences’ 
might be: how can a civil society be forged when non-factional bonds of kinship, religion or language 
are not easily available, and when existing narratives and experiences are unhelpful? Given the 
increasing salience of bottom-up citizen initiatives in plugging societal needs and leading societal 
change in the face of a weak or ineffective government, our interest was to understand what 
characteristics a planner would need to recognise in such initiatives in order to effectively work towards 
transformative change. This paper does not address what planners can do in such contexts, but is 
concerned primarily with which characteristics hold the potential towards transformative action for 
bridging deep differences. The two case studies show that there exists, at the very least in Beirut, 
bottom-up initiatives that attempt to transcend prevailing sectarian divides cherishing and promoting a 
sense of conviviality. Such initiatives seem to draw upon a deliberate selection of cultural materialities 
of place, emphasising a unique geography and history. Through their concern for the future, their 
innately spatial character and engagement with the public, such projects are of interest to planners 
working in similar contexts.  
23 
 
Jones (2007) suggests that in many Middle Eastern contexts, the idea of a nation-state is in tension with 
the grain of associational life as lived and facilitated by existing institutions. Social life in these contexts 
might be fostered and sustained through identities of family, kinship, sect, or language instead. Under 
such circumstances, Jones (2007) argues, the idea of political parties as common in the North-West can 
be viewed with suspicion for they can be seen as either or some of the following: 1) a vehicle for 
dictatorship; 2) a reinforcement of existing social cleavages; 3) an assembly of in-group elites and 4) 
an obstacle to the formation of a national consensus. As we have seen, Lebanon is governed by a 
confessional state, which though conceived originally as a temporary arrangement (Bollens, 2012) has 
never really transgressed into alternate forms.  
Civil society is often seen in opposition to and sometimes a substitute for national and state institutions. 
Such a view arises particularly when civil society is seen as the answer to the failure of the state, i.e., 
when state institutions cannot or will not deliver to the needs of citizens (Chettiparamb, 2006). As 
Berman (2009) highlights, this view of Civil society has also been problematic, especially in situations 
of conflict when high levels of associational life need not necessarily mean high levels of tolerance or 
empathy towards the ‘other’. This is often a consequence when associational life is patterned to 
reproduce axes of division more widely prevalent in society. Under such circumstances Chirot (2009) 
argues that the establishment of institutions normally regarded as fair such as free and fair elections for 
instance, could be problematic as this can be very threatening to the losers for it leads to a situation 
where the winner takes it all. The establishment of a genuinely transparent democracy can thus be 
counter-productive even if one is temporarily established. Chirot (2009) thus argues that creating a 
sustainable democracy in such contexts takes much more than holding elections or the moralising 
pressure from foreigners. It would necessitate the bottom-up creation of a national identity that can 
transcend factional identity first. 
Ways of establishing a society that moves away from a narrow focus on factional identities then is a 
time consuming enterprise (now widely recognised and acknowledged with current experiences of 
Western engagement elsewhere). In our framework we suggested ways in which a narrow factionally 
defined identity might be transcended through five alternate routes. These involved the judicious use of 
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commerce to ‘soften’ the hard edge of very narrow definitions of identity, the promotion of place based 
interests and identities (including a national identity) that can help transcend  divisions, the nurturing 
of various interest based identities that can potentially bring various factions together; the promotion of 
a culture of negotiation and dialogue wherein differences can be sorted, and finally the creation and 
nurturing of institutions that can facilitate or stabilise top-down or bottom-up initiatives.   
The case studies manifest instances of the working of the first three routes. Thus we find the use of 
commerce to bring together traders from all parts of the country from all sects in a syndicate or trading 
association to promote and sell their produce. Simultaneously, these markets were used to mobilise 
people to visit areas outside Beirut and all over the country. In a climate of increasing difficulty of sales 
due to imports, the general atmosphere of insecurity caused by the political instability and the incursion 
of high end shopping malls that cater for the wealthier, this can act as an incentive for reaching beyond 
sectarian identities.  
Place based interests and identities have been encouraged by fusing the materiality of the interests with 
qualities of place. Thus in the flower market, indigenous flowers that aid and reinforce a Lebanese 
identity are marketed. Similarly in the farmer’s market, Lebanese produce and culinary skills are 
celebrated. In terms of identity, such non-political activities give people hope of the co-presence of 
differences within national unity (Hanf, 1993). These initiatives bring various interest groups into the 
political project of nation building using the medium itself as the message.  
An examination of the formal structures and resources that underpin the cases show the existence of a 
formalised institutional entity: the syndicate, and the trading association for which and on behalf of 
which, individuals self-organise. Top- down planning schemes and policies are not involved in these 
cases. The formation of such associations transcend narrow identities and they constitute the first step 
towards the realisation of the fourth and fifth routes that can have the potential to progress towards a 
more stable society that can learn to live with the ‘other’. The organisational institutionalisation of the 
markets however does not match the spatial institutionalisation of the same. Spatially, the markets rely 
on temporarily activating rather mundane privately owned parking lots into vibrant public spaces where 
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anyone can enter, enjoy, stay idle and meet the other serendipitously. The dearth of public spaces in 
Beirut might be one reason for this, but the shifting nature of the markets also helps in breaking spatially 
coded sectarian associations. Rather than planning for spaces of encounter, these initiatives illustrate 
transformative actions where ‘sectarian interface’ (Bollens, 2012: 198) becomes a positive step towards 
overcoming divides. These spaces allow for the ‘flexibility and porosity’ (Bollens, 2012: 240) in the 
city, features that could accommodate differences and integrate individuals through mundane activities 
of urban life. As Bollens (2012) argues, although encounters among sectarian groups exist in work 
places, commercial and institutional activities, initiatives - such as these markets - serve to widen 
interactions and expand social networks across sectarian communities. They to some extent therefore 
reinstate ‘shared space’ considered as a major war loss in Beirut (Bollens, 2012: 197).  
The cases above then present specific instances of how the five pathways we identified theoretically 
might be visible in embedded practices. The pathways form a palette, but the particular mix and hue 
that can guide action in a particular case is situated and thus an empirical question. We find in these 
cases, initiatives where there is an attempt to bridge entrenched sectarian identities through the 
ideological active use of place, interests and materialities in practical projects. The nurturing and 
planning of such projects from the bottom-up or top-down is surely an enterprise that planners can 
identify with. Whilst it cannot be claimed that such initiatives will inevitably herald the end of violence 
and sectarianism, it can certainly be claimed, from the empirical evidence presented above, that they 
set the scene for ideas and attitudes that can accommodate the other. As Seligman (2009: 113) suggests 
the concept of civil society is when sociability is ‘seen to rest in a shared capacity towards moral 
sentiments and natural sympathy among people seen to share in a public good’. The introduction, 
nurturing and eventual stabilisation of such public projects are endeavours that planners can promote. 
Conclusion  
In this paper we were interested in planning in deeply divided societies. We suggested that while 
planning is necessarily context dependent and there are a set of conditions that may more commonly be 
found in the global South–East rather than the global North-West, it is now a reality that these two 
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geographies interlace more than ever. Under the circumstances, it would probably be more useful to 
talk about conditions in which planning of a certain sort might or might not work. This paper focused 
on the context of Lebanon – a country deeply divided by sectarian interests and known for its weak 
government. In these circumstances the central challenge for the planner is how a civil society based on 
values that exceed factional identities and interests can be built. There has been considerable interest in 
bottom-up initiatives lately, with planning thought (re)centring more towards civil society led 
initiatives. While the question of how planners might work with such initiatives is important, we argued 
that the question of what initiatives might hold promise in what types of change is equally important 
and must be answered apriori.  Building upon the planning and political science literature, we suggested 
five separate characteristics that may need to be present individually or in combination in bottom-up 
initiatives that attempt to bridge deep differences. These involve the judicious use of market based 
initiatives, the active promotion of place based identities, the promotion of alternate interest based 
identities, the use of consensus-oriented practices and processes, and the effective use of institutions. 
The presence of these five pathways was demonstrated in two bottom-up initiatives in Beirut: a flower 
market and a farmer’s market.  Both cases show how an identity that is larger than a sectarian identity 
is advertised and promoted, by using strategies that encompass the five ways identified earlier. Whilst 
these ‘bridging initiatives’ are by themselves not the solution to the conflict, they certainly contribute 
to an agenda that seeks to transcend narrow sectarianism to encounter, share and appreciate a wider 
agenda. At the very least they provide conceptual and experiential resources useful in countering 
unhelpful stereo-typed presentations of the ‘other’. The ‘bridging enterprises’ in the presented case 
studies build from materialities that are innately place-centred and people-centred thus evoking a 
geography and history that are wider than sectarian divisions. The judicious, but nevertheless 
ideological synthesis of enterprise, geography and history through specific materialities is of importance 
to planners and planning, in that it demonstrates the possibility for positive and meaningful action in 
‘deeply divided’ societies. 
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